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The Solemn Moment:

Expanding Therapeutic Jurisprudence Throughout Estate
Planning

Mark Glover∗
“With the check written but not yet signed, he swiveled back in his desk
chair and seemed to ponder. The agent, a stocky, somewhat bald, rather
informal man named Bob Johnson, hoped his client wasn’t having last-minute
doubts. Herb was hardheaded, a slow man to make a deal; Johnson had
worked over a year to clinch this sale. But, no, his customer was merely
experiencing what Johnson called the Solemn Moment—a phenomenon
familiar to insurance salesmen. The mood of a man insuring his life is not
unlike that of a man signing his will; thoughts of mortality must occur.” 1
In the above excerpt from his true-life crime thriller, In Cold Blood, Truman
Capote touches upon two important insights regarding estate planning. The
first is the connection between the traditional estate planning tool of the will
and newer modes of posthumous wealth transmission, such as life insurance. A
will’s primary function is to transfer property upon death, 2 and life insurance,
revocable trusts, joint bank accounts, and other so-called “will substitutes”
function similarly. 3 Specifically, each results in the transfer of wealth at the
time of the donor’s death. 4 For example, just as a will transfers property to
designated beneficiaries upon the testator’s death, life insurance results in the
transfer of the death benefit to designated beneficiaries upon the death of the
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 2011;
J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University School of Law, 2008. Thanks to the University of Wyoming
College of Law for research support and to Professor David Yamada and Suffolk University Law School for
organizing and hosting the conference, titled The Study and Practice of Law in a Therapeutic Key: An
Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, from which this essay originates.
1. TRUMAN CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD: A TRUE ACCOUNT OF A MULTIPLE MURDER AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 46-47 (1965).
2. See Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain, 189 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Ark. 2004) (“A will is a disposition of
property to take effect upon the death of the maker of the instrument.”); Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary
Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155,
166 (2008) (“Wills remain the archetypal vehicle for effecting gratuitous transfers of property interests at
death.”).
3. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 435 (9th ed. 2013).
4. See id.
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insured. This connection between wills and other modes of posthumous wealth
transmission has drawn considerable scholarly attention, and the prominent role
that will substitutes play in contemporary estate planning has been labeled the
“Nonprobate Revolution.” 5
Capote’s second important insight is the connection between estate planning
and mortality. Putting one’s affairs in order, whether through the execution of
a will or the purchase of a life insurance policy, places death at the forefront of
one’s mind. 6 After all, estate planning is essentially preparation for the
unpredictability of one’s own death, and as Capote puts simply, “thoughts of
mortality must occur” when undertaking such preparation. 7 Because of this
unavoidable confrontation with mortality, estate planning can have
psychological consequences. 8 In the seconds prior to insuring his life, Herb
experienced a brief moment of reflection—an occurrence that Herb’s insurance
salesman calls “the Solemn Moment.” 9 Others experience more severe
consequences, such as fear or death anxiety. 10 Some avoid estate planning
altogether in order to escape the unpleasantness of confronting their
mortality. 11
Although the connection between estate planning and mortality may seem
evident, legal scholars have not significantly considered the effect of estate
planning on the psychological wellbeing of those preparing for death. More
specifically, they have devoted little thought to the role that therapeutic
jurisprudence can play in the analysis of the estate planning process and the
related law of succession. Therapeutic jurisprudence, which focuses attention
on the psychological consequences of the law and seeks to increase its
therapeutic potential, 12 would seem to provide an obvious framework through
which to evaluate the law in an area that has so many psychological
repercussions.
Again, the mere act of preparing for one’s death has clear psychological
implications. But beyond the possible fear and anxiety experienced by the one

5. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1108 (1984).
6. See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family
Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 438 (2009) (describing psychological effect of estate
planning ceremony).
7. CAPOTE, supra note 1, at 47.
8. See generally Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427 (2012).
9. CAPOTE, supra note 1, at 47.
10. See Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony–History, Significance, and Strategies, 29 S. TEX.
L. REV. 413, 419 (1988) (explaining psychological effects of will execution ceremony).
11. See Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-In Will Forms—The First Decade: Theoretical Constructs and
Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 778 (1993) (highlighting notable historical figures who died without
wills).
12. See generally David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 125
(2000).
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confronting mortality, estate planning and the law of succession can also have
negative psychological consequences for those left behind. After a loved one’s
death, the family not only must deal with a profound loss but also must
navigate the process of settling the decedent’s estate. If disputes arise during
this process, familial conflict and the emotional and psychological issues of
grieving family members can intensify. 13 Because the law of succession and
the lawyers that aid in the estate planning process interact with those dealing
with these negative psychological experiences, legal scholars should explore
how the law and the role of the estate-planning lawyer can be shaped to ease
these anti-therapeutic effects.
Although few and far between, a handful of scholars have drawn attention to
the psychological implications of estate planning, the law of succession, and
the probate process. 14 For example, Professor Thomas Shaffer has explored
ways that the estate-planning attorney can positively affect the psychological
wellbeing of those confronting their mortality during the estate-planning
process. 15 A small body of scholarship has also developed around the issue of
how the probate process can become a more therapeutic experience for the
decedent’s family. 16 While this prior work sheds important light on the
psychological consequences of the law and has suggested innovative reforms
that could make the estate planning and probate processes more therapeutic,
much of this scholarship does not specifically use therapeutic jurisprudence as
its analytical foundation.
With the goal of inspiring broader therapeutic-jurisprudential analysis within
this area, I have worked to develop a therapeutic-jurisprudential framework of
estate planning through which to analyze a variety of aspects of the law of
succession; and I have applied this framework to evaluate and suggest reforms
of the law of will-execution. 17 However, as Capote reminds us, estate planning
involves much more than visiting a lawyer and executing a will. 18 Indeed,
contemporary estate planning employs various will substitutes, and the use of

13. See Ronald Chester, Less Law, but More Justice?: Jury Trials and Mediation as Means of Resolving
Will Contests, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 195-96 (1999).
14. See Beyer, supra note 10, at 419-20; Pamela R. Champine, A Sanist Will?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
547, 560-62 (2002-2003).
15. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The “Estate Planning” Counselor and Values Destroyed by Death, 55 IOWA
L. REV. 376, 382 (1969); Thomas L. Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young Family Clients and the Psychology of
Testation, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 377 (1969).
16. See, e.g., Chester, supra note 13, at 193-203; Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using
Mediation To Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397,
425-28 (1997); Patricia Monroe Wisnom, Note, Probate Law and Mediation: A Therapeutic Perspective, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 1345, 1356-58 (1995).
17. See Glover, supra note 8; Mark Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U.
KAN. L. REV. 139 (2012); see also Mark Glover, The Heiligenstadt Testament: Beethoven’s Therapeutic Estate
Planning Experience, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://arizonastatelawjournal.org/the-heiligenstadttestament-beethovens-therapeutic-estate-planning-experience/, archived at http://perma.cc/D6FU-FJ3R.
18. See CAPOTE, supra note 1, at 46-47.
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will substitutes to transfer property upon death would seem to raise similar
psychological issues as the use of wills. Yet, scholars have not examined this
area of estate planning through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Therefore, the goal of the remainder of this essay is to begin the discussion of
how therapeutic-jurisprudential analysis could be applied to the role that will
substitutes play in the estate planning process.
Because they transfer property upon death, will substitutes, such as
revocable trusts, life insurance, joint bank accounts, and pension accounts,
function similarly to wills. 19 Despite this functional similarity, many will
substitutes differ from traditional wills in one important respect. Unlike wills,
the confrontation with death is not an inherent consequence of all nonprobate
transfers. A donor may have a legitimate lifetime purpose to effectuate a
nonprobate transfer apart from preparing for death. For example, when a
husband and wife open a joint bank account, they might have motives other
than preparing for the transfer of the account assets upon one of their deaths.
Instead, the couple may open the account for reasons of convenience or
simplicity, to reduce banking fees, or to symbolize their marital commitment. 20
Likewise, when an employee designates a death beneficiary for a pension
account, she might not fully consider that she is planning for her own death but
may simply complete the designation along with the many other forms required
to start a new job. Because a donor pursuant to these nonprobate transfers may
have motives other than planning for death, the use of these will substitutes is
less likely to produce death anxiety than the execution of a will.
Other will substitutes, however, potentially produce death anxiety similar to
that caused by traditional wills. As Capote eloquently illustrates, by purchasing
life insurance, the insured acknowledges the inevitability of death and must
explicitly contemplate her mortality. 21 Not surprisingly, people display similar
hesitation and anxiety when purchasing life insurance as they do when
executing wills. 22 Consequently, as a tactic to make their products and services
more marketable, insurance companies sell life insurance rather than death
insurance, and “agents are careful to omit the word death from their discussions
with clients.” 23 These marketing ploys are not always successful because, just
as death anxiety contributes to high rates of intestacy, similar concerns

19. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
20. See LAWRENCE J. GITMAN & MICHAEL D. JOEHNK, PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING 115 (11th ed.
2008) (“One advantage of the joint account over two individual accounts is lower service charges.”); TERENCE
MYERS ET AL., CCH FINANCIAL AND ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 72 (18th ed. 2009) (explaining that joint
accounts “are obviously very convenient for married couples”).
21. See CAPOTE, supra note 1, at 46-47.
22. See David W. Marnold, The Challenge of Selling Life Insurance, 26 LIMRA’S MARKETFACTS Q. 30,
30 (2007) (“Consumers simply don’t want to think about buying life insurance because of what it implies about
their own mortality.”).
23. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 71-72 (8th ed. 2009).

2015]

THE SOLEMN MOMENT

23

“contribute to [the] inadequate purchase of life insurance.” 24
In addition to life insurance, revocable trusts have the potential to produce
death anxiety. But while life insurance’s death anxiety potential stems from the
insured’s desire to plan for death and not necessarily from an intent to avoid the
use of a will, the creation of a revocable trust may produce death anxiety
because the settlor specifically uses the trust as a substitute for a traditional
will. Revocable trusts are well suited for use as intentional will substitutes
because they are “the most will-like” nonprobate transfer. 25 Other will
substitutes generally govern the transfer of specific assets, such as the cash
deposited in a joint bank account or the death benefit of a life insurance policy,
but revocable trusts can be used to dispose of a variety of assets and therefore
more closely resemble traditional wills. 26 Because of their flexibility and
similarity to traditional wills, most settlors create revocable trusts specifically
to avoid the need for wills. 27 In such situations, the settlor’s potential for death
anxiety mirrors that of a testator who executes a will.
Over the last several decades, the role of will substitutes within
contemporary estate planning has grown. 28 In fact, decedents now pass more
wealth via will substitutes than through wills. 29 With this increased
significance of will substitutes, particularly revocable trusts, 30 a major issue
within the scholarly discourse of the law of succession is the degree to which
the law of wills and the law of will substitutes should be harmonized. 31 For
instance, legal scholars have devoted much attention to the issue of whether the
rules that govern the creation, construction, and substantive limitations of wills
should also apply to will substitutes. 32 Because of the evolving nature of this
area of law, will substitutes present a ripe opportunity for policymakers to
consider the psychological consequences of estate planning. Ultimately they

24.
25.
26.
27.

Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 234 (2008).
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 23, at 414.
See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1115 & n.32.
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 601 cmt. (2010) (“The revocable trust is used primarily as a will
substitute.”); Stanley M. Johanson, Revocable Trusts and Community Property: The Substantive Problems, 47
TEX. L. REV. 537, 550 (1969) (explaining “distinctive characteristic of” revocable trust where settlor is also
trustee “is that it is not incidentally, not primarily, but solely intended as a substitute for a will.”).
28. See Langbein, supra note 5, at 1109.
29. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 3, at 435.
30. See id. (“The revocable trust has . . . emerged as the successor to the will as the centerpiece instrument
in contemporary estate planning.”).
31. See id. “The rise of private succession raises two principal legal questions. First, must a will
substitute be executed with Wills Act formalities to be valid? Second, to what extent should the policy-based
substantive limits on testation by will, and the rules of construction applicable to a will, collectively the
subsidiary law of wills, apply also to a will substitute?” See id.
32. See, e.g., Elaine H. Gagliardi, Remembering the Creditor at Death: Aligning Probate and
Nonprobate Transfers, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 819 (2007); Susan N. Gary, Applying Revocation-onDivorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 83 (2004); Jeffrey S. Kinsler, The Unmerry
Widow: Spousal Disinheritance and Life Insurance in North Carolina, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1869 (2009); Alan
Newman, Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 523 (2008).
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exemplify therapeutic jurisprudence’s potential to provide important insights on
a variety of issues throughout the law of succession. 33

33. See Glover, supra note 8, at 467-70 (suggesting potential areas within law of succession to analyze
from therapeutic-jurisprudential perspective).

